Madhvaon Brahma Sūtra 2.1.26

This is also an objection to the theory of holding the individual soul to be the absolute agent. For'then if he should proceed to act but with a single finger it would have to be granted that he acts with all his might. But this is not admissible, for observation shows that (at a time) only a part of his (soul’s) capability is brought into play. Nor could it be said that he acts only through a portion of himself; for he is without parts. If this were not conceded, there would be conflict with the Bhallaveya Sruti : “ He who is of this character is the soul; he (the soul) is eternal, without parts; is the agent of knowing, is devoid of perception, is happy, is miserable and dwells in the body and senses.” Further it cannot be said that the soul proceeds to act by his conditioned part. For the soul whose part is said to be conditioned should either be conditioned as a whole or in part. The first alternative cannot be chosen; for he is not observed to act as an individual whole. The second alternative is also impossible ; for it would imply that the soul really has parts, so that a part alone might be conditioned. And no other theory unsupported by authorities should besought to account for the activity of the indivi- dual soul. For, whatever is observed to be a fact, though it may appear inexplicable by reasoning, is really a thing brought about by the Lord. This expla- nation of the difficulty caused by reasoning being declared, (no real conflict arising from reasoning should be supposed with regard to the activity attributed to the soul).