Madhvaon Brahma Sūtra 2.2.12

As the Vaiseshika admits * Samavaya,’ the relation of inherence, between the cause and effect, etc.—and as on, his own principle this relation itself is absolutely separate from the things which it has to bring together, a second * Samavaya ’ or relation of its kind would have to be granted to bring the first relation and the things together, so a third, a fourth, etc-, ad infinitum. It would not do to hold that this assumption of ‘ Samavaya ’ can still be authoritative, and the contingent regressus in infinitum does not impair the strength of the argument or theory ; (nor could it be held that this endless chain of Samavayas is proved in actuality). For when the very first relation (link) remains unsettled, the whole series is of course un- settled. On the other hand, if it were granted that the first relation is a self-sufficient principle, (ix., capable of bring- ing about the connection with the parts and the whole) as well as its connection with the parts and the whole) then the relation of inherence (Samavaya) would itself be un- necessary.