Śaṅkaraon Brahma Sūtra 2.3.53

Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ which is seated in the body must take place in that part of each Self which is limited by the body ; and that thus there may result from difference of locality a limitative distinction of resolutions, &c., of the adr/sh/a, and of reply, is not possible pleasure and pain. —This also, we For, as being equally ‘on account of the being within.’ infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vahe- shikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume such a part of the Self which in reality is without any parts, that part because merely assumptive will be in- capable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible to limit the body which originates in proximity to all (omnipresent)’ Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same place. For wc may observe, e. g. that after Devadattas body has moved away from a certain spot in which Deva- datta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain, and the body of Ya^^'wadatta has moved into that very same place, Ya^«adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or pain ; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take place; for the admh/a is effected in definite places such as e. g. the body of a BrAhma;/a, and the enjoyment of the heavenly world is bound to a definite different — place. It further^ is impossible to maintain that there exist many all-pervading Selfs as there are no parallel instances. Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying the same place!—You will perhaps bring forward colour and so on*'^. But wc refuse to accept that instance as parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ through their essential characteristics. On the other hand there is no difference of characteristics between your (alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of characteristics can be established on the ground of the ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the assumption of difference of characteristics and the as- sumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other. ^ And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sahkhyas as well as of the Vaijeshikas. Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same space. ® Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one * place as belonging to one material object. Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervading- ness of ether, &c. (the ‘ &c/ implying place and time), we reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether and so on as mere effects. All which establishes the conclusion that the only doc- trine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the Self.