Sūtra 3.3.2Śaṅkara · 3.3.2

Śaṅkaraon Brahma Sūtra 3.3.2

Advaita Vedānta

Sūtra

भेदान्नेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि

bhedānneti cennaikasyāmapi

Sūtra translation

(If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya (different secondary matters may find place).

In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Veclanta-texts, because we meet with differences in secondary matters (gu«a). Thus the Vd- ^asaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the five fires a sixth fire (‘And then the fire is indeed fire,’ Bri, Up. VI, 2, 14), while the AV/andogas mention no sixth fire but conclude their text of the pa;7Mgnividycl with the express mention of five fires (‘ But he who thus knows the five fires,’ Kk Up. V, 10, 10). Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those who admit that particular qualification (i. e. the sixth fire) and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidyA of the — A'Aandogas ; for that would contradict the number ‘ five ’ expressly stated by them. In the colloquy of the pranas — i88 vedanta-sAtras. again the iST/^andogas mention, in addition to the most important pr^;/a, four other prdnas, viz. speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind ; while the VA^asaneyins mention a fifth one also, ‘ Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that becomes rich in offspring and cattle' (Br/. fjp. VI, i, 6). Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and omission effects a difference in the object known, and the latter again effects a difference in the vidyd, just as a difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes one sacrifice from another. To this we make the following reply.—Your objection is without force, since such differences of qualification as are met with in the above instances are possible even in one and the same vidya. In the AT/zandogya- text a sixth fire is indeed not inclufied ; yet, as five fires, beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot effect a split of the vidya ; not any more than the atir^itra-sacrifice is differentiated by the sho^/ajin-rite being either used or not-used. Moreover, the AT/^dndogya- text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage, — V, 9, z, * When he has departed, his friends carry him, as appointed, to the fire.’ The Va^asaneyins, on the other hand, mention their sixth fire (‘and then the fire is indeed fire, the fuel fuel,’ &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which runs through the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified. Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but) is merely a remark about something already established (known) ^ And even if we assume that the statement about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be inserted in the vidy^L of the ATAandogas without any fear of its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there ; ' Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which is known from perception. for that number is not an essential part of the injunction \ but merely makes an additional statement regarding some- thing known already from the text, viz. the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are identified Simi- larly nothing stands in the way of some additional quali- fication being included in the vldySi concerning the colloquy of the prd^as and so on. The addition or omission of some particular qualification is unable to introduce differ- ence into the object of knowledge and thereby into the knowledge itself ; for although the objects of knowledge may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same time the knowing person are understood to be the same. Hence the vidy^ also remains the same.