Śaṅkaraon Brahma Sūtra 3.3.19

. In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyi-.yakha there is a vidya called the .Sa;/<^/ilya-vidya, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, ‘ Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the pr^l;/a for its body and light for its form,* &c.— In the Bri- had-ara;^yaka again, which belongs to the same vSi^kha, we read (V, 10, 6), ‘ That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or — barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all he rules all — this whatsoever exists.* A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidyd in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not. The pdrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different 5dkhas we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others ; so e.g, in the colloquy of the pra;/as. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same .SYikha cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidyd and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage arc not to be combined with those of the other. To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different 6'akhas form one vidya in A\'hich the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same 5aklui, constitute one vidyei only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no differ- ence of character we cannot detennine difference of vidya ; and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars men- tioned in different places cannot be held apart.— But has it — not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ? Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidy^, and the other the particulars of the vidya.—But in that 'case the Brfhad-drawyaka ought to mention only those points which arc not mentioned in the ; while it ought Agnirahasya, as e.g. ‘ he is the Lord of all ' not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agni- rahasya, as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind !—Not so, we reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is already mentioned in the other passage enables us to recognise the vidya. The BWhad-ara//yaka-passage, by mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to recognise the 5a;/^/ilya-vidya, and then teaches certain particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise should we know that the Br/.-passage is meant to enjoin particulars for the »S'a;^/'/ilya-vidya ? Moreover, as in a passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it teaches something not yet established, a reference to some- thing iilready established is justified on the ground of its being a (so-called) nityanuvMa, we cannot overlook the recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one) which is rendered possible through that anuvada. Hence, although the two passages belong to one and the same wS'akha, they yet constitute one vidya only, and their particu- lars have to be combined into one whole.