Śaṅkaraon Brahma Sūtra 3.3.58

In the preceding adhikara;/a we have arrived at the con- clusion that a meditation on Vauvanara as a whole is the pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results are stated for meditations on Sute^s and so on. On the ground of this it may be presumed that other medita- tions also which are enjoined by separate scriptural texts have to be combined into more general medita- tions. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of vidyds (acts of cognition ; meditations) as long as the object of cognition is the same ; for the object constitutes the character of a cognition in the same way as the material offered and the divinity to which the offering is made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we understand that the Lord forms the only object of cog- nition in a number of scriptural passages, although the latter are separate in enunciation ; cp. c. g. * He con- sisting of mind, whose body is pra^m' [Kh, Up. Ill, 14, 2); ‘Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha’ [Kh, Up. IV, 10, 5); ‘ He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true (/v A. ' Up. VI 1 , 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Prawa is referred to in different texts ; cp. ‘ Pr^wa indeed is the end of all ’ (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3) ; ‘ Prawa indeed is the oldest and the best' {Kh, Up. V, i, i).; ‘Pr^//a is father, Prci;/a is mother' {Kh, Up. VH, 15, i). And from the unity of the object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor ^ Yadobhayatropastisiddhantas tada vyastopastir evatra sama- stopastir eva vd pdrvapaksha/i sy^n n^dya ity aha, spash/e ^eti, dviityaj tatrayukto vakyopakramasthavyastopdstidhivirodh'^t. An. Gi. can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one pradhAna which is their common subject). Hence the different qualities which are enjoined in one^s own and in other vS'akhas, and which all belong to one object of know- ledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition may be effected. Although To this conclusion we reply, ‘ Separate,^ &c. the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate ‘on account of the difference of words and the — like.’ For the text exhibits a difference of words such as ‘ he knows,’ ‘ let him meditate,’ ‘ let him form the idea’ (cp. Kh, Up. III. 14, 1). And difference of tferms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to Ptirva Mimawsa-sutras II, 2, i.—The clause ‘and the like’ in the Sutra intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstance.s, as reasons for the separateness of — acts. But, an objection is raised, from passages such as ‘ he knows ’ and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as ‘he sacrifices’ and the like (ya^ate, ^ulioti, dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.) denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case^. How then docs difference of vidya follow from difference of words?—This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of vidyd may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the same Pra;/a is the object of meditation in the other series * Vedop^sitetyadwabdana»2 kva^^ ^wanaw kva/^id dhyanam ity arthabhedam ^jahkya ^>7anas4vidheyatvdd vidhiyamanam upasa- nam evety ^ha arthdntareti. An. Gi. of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separate- ness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the pCirva- pakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidyd itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyd- vidhi and which the guwavidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidya established elsewhere^. Nor should, in the case of the piirvapakshin^s view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as ‘having true wishes,’ be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is en- joined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself^. Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a — meditation on something whole such as there is in the — case of the cognition of the Vabwanara owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cog- nition being one we should admit unity of vidya without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether im- possible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyas.—The present adhikarawa being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to be considered ^ — ^ For to enjoin in one passage several qualities none of which is — established already would involve an objectionable viikyabheda. ® A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an akahksha, a desire of complementation. ® I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire pada. 28o vedanta-sCtras.